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COMMENTS
GLASS-STEAGALL: LEST WE FORGET*
LAWRENCE F. ORBE III
I. INTRODUCTION
In response to the Great Depression, federal legislation was en-
acted to separate commercial and investment banking. However,
the gradual sophistication of the banking industry and the creation
of a plethora of new financial services offered by banking institu-
tions have blurred this statutorily mandated division. This com-
ment will trace the history of this legislation and delineate the
principle actors responsible for its formulation. Next, an analogy
* For earlier discussions of the Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act) and related
issues, see Beatty, What are the Legal Limits to the Expansion of National Bank Services?
86 BANKING L.J. 3 (1969); Beatty, The Incidental Powers of National Banks, 4 NAT'L
BANKING REv. 263 (1967); Chase, The Emerging Financial Conglomerate: Liberalization of
the Bank Holding Company Act, 60 GEO. L.J. 1225 (1972); Clark and Saunders, Glass-
Steagall Revised: The Impact on Banks, Capital Markets, and the Small Investor, 97
BANKING L.J. 811 (1980); Evans, Regulation of Bank Securities Activities, 91 BANKING L.J.
611 (1974); Greenberg, Banks and the Federal Securities Laws: Some Recent
Developments, 49 S. CALIF. L. REV. 665 (1976); Israels, Banks and Federal Securities
Regulation, 85 BANKING L.J. 1 (1968); Karmel, Glass-Steagall: Some Critical Reflections, 97
BANKING L.J. 631 (1980); Lybecker, Bank-Sponsored Investment Management Services:
Consideration of the Regulatory Problems, and Suggested Legislative and Statutory
Interpretive Responses, 77 DUKE L.J. 938 (1977); Mehle, Bank Underwriting of Municipal
Revenue Bonds: Preserving Free and Fair Competition, 26 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1117 (1975);
Miller, The Participation of National Banks in Private Placements of Corporate
Securities, 13 NEw ENG. L. REv. 63 (1977); Perkins, The Divorce of Commercial and
Investment Banking: A History, 88 BANKING L.J. 483 (1971); Plotkin, What Meaning Does
Glass-Steagall Have for Today's Financial World? 95 BANKING L.J. 404 (1978); Rogowski,
Commercial Banks and Municipal Revenue Bonds, 95 BANKING L.J. 155 (1978); Schneider,
Evolving Proof Standards Under Section 7 and Mergers in Transitional Markets: The
Securities Industry Example, 81 Wis. L. REv. 1 (1981); Schweitzer, Banks and Banking - A
Review of a Definition, 94 BANKING L.J. 6 (1977); Securities Industry Association, Bank
Securities Activities: Memorandum for Study and Discussion, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 751
(1977); Willis, The Banking Act of 1933 in Operation, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 697 (1935);
Comment, Expansion of National Bank Powers: Regulatory and Judicial Precedent Under
the National Bank Act, Glass-Steagall Act, and Bank Holding Company Act, 36 Sw. L.J.
765 (1982); Comment, Banks and the Securities Act of 1933, 52 VA. L. REv. 117 (1966);
Note, Bank Holding Companies Attempt to Enter A Forbidden Market - Investment
Company Institute v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 80 Wis. L. REv.
976 (1980); Note, Glass-Steagall Act - A History of its Legislative Origins and Regulatory
Construction, 92 BANKING L.J. 38 (1975) (adapted from a press release of the Honorable
James E. Smith, Comptroller of the Currency); Note, The Glass-Steagall Banking Act of
1933, 47 HAxv. L. Rlv. 325 (1933).
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between the investment banking industry of the 1920's and the in-
dustry of the 1980's will demonstrate a recurrence of those factors
which precipitated the banking reform legislation of the 1930's. Fi-
nally, a proposal for remedial legislation to redefine the eroded line
of demarcation between commercial and investment banking will
be offered.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The Banking Act of 1933 was signed by President Franklin D.
Roosevelt on June 16, 1933,1 culminating a long series of reform
legislation affectionately or otherwise known as the "first 100 days"
of the New Deal. This Act has become known as the Glass-Steagall
Act, named for Senator Carter Glass, (D.-Virginia), and Represen-
tative Henry Steagall, (D.-Alabama), the sponsors of the
legislation.
Senator Glass had considered the creation of the Federal Re-
serve System his crowning achievement.2 He and other sponsors of
this 1913 legislation believed that they had created the ideal
financial structure to thwart panic and virtually eliminate depres-
sion.$ The 1929 market crash, the ensuing depression, and the in-
ability of financial institutions to spark economic recovery was
taken by Glass as a bitter personal defeat. This led Glass to begin
a three-year search for those factors which he believed had crip-
pled his "invincible" system. During preliminary investigations in
1930, Glass and his associates searched the practices of commercial
banks not specifically authorized by then-current legislation which
might have contributed to the crash and the resultant malaise.
Glass made up his mind early that a major cause of the depression
had been that commercial banking had become subservient to in-
vestment banking.
Columbia University Professor H. Parker Willis, generally recog-
nized as the country's foremost banking expert, was invited to
1. Ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
2. Perkins, The Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking: A History, 88 BANK-
ING L.J. 483, 498 (1971). Glass was former Secretary of the Treasury under President Wood-
row Wilson, Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, and Chairman of the sub-
committee which drafted the Glass-Steagall Act; he was an influential member of the
Senate. Note, Commercial Bank Private Placement Activity: Cracking Glass-Steagall, 27
CATH. U.L. REv. 743, 749 n. 46 (1978).
3. Perkins, supra note 2, at 498.
4. Id. at 498-500.
5. Id. at 500. See generally Operation of the National and Federal Reserve Banking
Systems: Hearings on S. Res. 71 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 71st Cong., 3d Seas., Part I (1931) [hereinafter cited as 1931 Hearings].
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Washington to assist in conducting hearings and drafting new leg-
islation.6 Willis, other academicians at Columbia and banking
scholars generally believed, based on what they perceived to be a
successful model in England, that by limiting a bank's lending ac-
tivities solely to bona fide commercial lending purposes, the na-
tion's economy would rebound. Permanent capital investment
funds were to come from "real savings" and not from banking ac-
tivities.7 This theory has strongly affected the United States mone-
tary policy for decades'
Both Willis and Glass had warned the banking community
throughout the 1920's of the dangers of market speculation, which
they believed was substantially encouraged by the passage of the
McFadden Act in 1927.9 The McFadden Act modified earlier legis-
lation which had provided for prohibition of certain investment
banking activities by commercial banks. 10 The investment banking
activity enlarged by the McFadden Act was conducted by means of
security affiliates.1 These security affiliates were highly visible be-
cause they were engaged in retail distribution, and this became an
early target of the Glass investigation. Willis and Glass believed
that banks with security affiliates operated with lax loan standards
because a quick public offering could bail the bank out if the loan
was improvident.12 Willis in particular believed that severe legisla-
tive restrictions imposing limited permissible financial activities on
commercial banks could recreate the stable financial world of 1915-
1917.1' However, the political situation in 1930 was such that a
banking bill with strict provisions would probably not pass the Re-
6. Perkins, supra note 2, at 501.
7. Id. For an example of this philosophy, written during the tumultuous 1930's see Wil-
lis, The Banking Act of 1933 in Operation, 35 COLuu. L. REv. 697 (1935).
8. L. MINTS, A HISTORY OF BANKING THEORY IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES,
1-10 (1956); Perkins, supra note 2, at 501-2.
9. Ch. 191, 44 Stat. 1224 (1927). See Consolidation of National Banking Associations:
Hearings on S. 1782 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Cur-
rency, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 46-58 (1926) (testimony of Willis), 137-53 (summary conclusions
of report). Perkins, supra note 2, at 502.
10. Ch. 191, 44 Stat. 1224 (1927). This Act modified the National Bank Act, ch. 106, 13
Stat. 99 (1864). The Act permitted direct bank underwriting of investment securities with
certain requirements as to bank capital and marketability. Three conditions were set forth
for the marketability test: 1) the large size of the issue, 2) public distribution of the se-
curity, and 3) a trustee independent of the issuer. See Rogowski, Commercial Banks and
Municipal Revenue Bonds, 95 BANKING L.J. 155, 157 (1978).
11. For a more detailed description of security affiliate, see infra notes 61-68 and accom-
panying text.
12. 1931 Hearings, supra note 5.
13. Perkins, supra note 2, at 503.
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publican-controlled Senate. The Hoover administration was un-
likely to support legislation unpopular on Wall Street. Further,
many Hoover advisors, including Secretary of the Treasury An-
drew Mellon, had an ideological commitment to self-reform." Yet,
Hoover's administration posed no barriers to the conduct of a thor-
ough investigation by Glass.1 5 In fact, it was not until after the
1932 election defeat that Hoover let his personal convictions be
known."
Hearings on early drafts of the Glass Banking Bill were held
during 1931 and 1932.1' The hearings received widespread public-
ity, and Glass made use of them to promote reform proposals. 8
Senator James Couzens, (R.-Michigan), who had been a partner of
Henry Ford prior to his election to the Senate was a sharp critic of
the financial community and provided Glass with valuable support
because of his extensive business background.19 Testimony was
given by representatives of some of the banks with security affili-
ates, the New York Federal Reserve Bank, the Federal Reserve
Board, and the American Bankers' Association. 0 Several key wit-
nesses advocated a complete separation of commercial and invest-
ment banking.21 Fervent supporters of the existing structure later
changed their minds:
Mr. PECORA. I addressed a question to Mr. Wiggin [retired
Chairman, Chase National Bank] just prior to your having been
sworn, in which I asked him to give the committee the reason or
reasons for the change that was made in May of 1933 in the char-
ter or bylaws of the Chase Securities Corporation.
Mr. ALDRICH. [President and Chairman, Chase National
Bank] Mr. Chairman, that goes into a great many things. The an-
swer to that question requires consideration of a number of
things. Sometime ago-I think it was in March of this year when
that policy was announced of divorcing the securities affiliate of
14. G. SMITH, THE SHATTERED DREAM, 55-82 (1970). Mellon was a social Darwinist who
detested any thought of tinkering with the system. Id. at 57.
15. Perkins, supra note 2, at 504.
16. Id. at 505; SMITH, supra note 14, at 235-39.
17. Senate Resolution 71 led to these hearings and to the ultimate passage of the
legislation.
18. Note, supra note 2, at 748; Perkins, supra note 2, at 506.
19. Perkins, supra note 2, at 510.
20. See 1931 Hearings, supra note 5, at 31, 106, 123, 183, 227, 251, 271.
21. These included Adolf Miller, a member of the Federal Reserve Board; John Broder-
ick, New York Superintendent of Banking; Owen Young, Chairman of General Electric
Company and a Director of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, and of course Willis. See
1931 Hearings, supra note 5, at 123, 271. See also Perkins, supra note 2, at 506-515.
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Chase National Bank and changing the charter of the Chase Se-
curities Co. so that it could not deal in securities - I took occasion
to make a statement as to what I thought should be done with
regard to the divorcement of investment banking from the bank-
ing done by the large commercial banks.
The reasons for the conclusion that I had reached go back quite
a long distance in the past. And I had come to the conclusion that
it was not desirable for commercial banking and investment
banking to be conducted in close affiliation . . . But I think that
for the purpose of the record at this time I might say that I had
come to the conclusion, for a great many reasons, that the busi-
ness of commercial banking and investment banking should be
absolutely divorced, and for that reason at that time we started
dissolution proceedings of the Chase Harris Forbes Companies,
and we changed the charter of the Chase Securities Corporation
so that it could no longer deal in securities, and changed its name,
and that corporation also is in course of liquidation."'
Concentration of economic power and conflicts of interest, ac-
centuated by bank operation of security affiliates, were perceived
to have caused a loss of public confidence in banks.2 " The hearings
enumerated the following adverse elements of the commercial
bank/security affiliate relationship:
1. The security affiliate may borrow money from the parent
bank or sell securities to the parent bank.
2. The parent bank might freely lend money to security affili-
ate investment banking clients to facilitate distribution of
securities.
22. Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings on S. Res. 84, and S. Res. 56 Before the Comm.
on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2294-95 (1933) [hereinafter cited as 1933
Hearings]. Some testimony was incredulous, particularly to the public which had lost so
heavily in the preceding months. See especially the testimony of Stanley Russell, Montclair,
New Jersey, Vice President of National City Co., security affiliate of National City Bank.
Russell testified that National City Co. loaned funds to a company to facilitate a merger,
purchased $20 million of securities from the combined companies, allowed a principal of the
company to participate in the syndicate as a "silent partner," sold the common stock por-
tion of the securities package at $48 per share (having purchased the stock immediately
prior to the offering at $10 per share) and beat Eastman, Dillon & Co. entirely out of its
banking relationship because, as a security affiliate, National City Co. could secure the busi-
ness by loaning funds when needed as seed money to effectuate the merger, which made the
offering possible. The public financing repaid the bank loan. Stock Exchange Practices:
Hearings on S. 'Res. 84 and S. Res. 239 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. 2269-97 (1933).
23. Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 638 (1971); Note, Bank Holding Compa-
nies Attempt to Enter a Forbidden Market-Investment Company Institute v. Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1980 Wis. L. Rav. 976, 981 (1980).
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3. Close public identification of the security affiliate with the
bank could create the possibility of a run on the bank if large
market losses were sustained by the security affiliate.
4. A temptation might exist to shore up the affiliate through
unsound loans or to purchase securities from it.
5. Unneeded price volatility might be created in the bank's
stock because of the security affiliate's activities in the stock
market.
6. The parent bank might permit the affiliate to assume
higher risks than the parent bank could or would.
7. The promotional needs of investment banking might cause
the bank to lend its reputation for prudence and restraint to the
enterprise of selling stocks.
8. The parent bank might freely loan money to customers to
facilitate the purchase of securities offered by its security affiliate.
9. The parent bank could market unsound or speculative in-
vestments to correspondent banks.
10. If the parent bank operates a trust department, the pos-
session of a security affiliate may adversely affect the indepen-
dence of the trust department.
11. Knowledge of the existence of the security affiliate might
cause the bank to consider unwise commitments, knowing such
positions could be shifted to the security affiliate.
12. Trading of the affiliate in the bank's own stock could lead
to unnecessary and speculative price fluctuations in the bank's
stock.
13. When an affiliate acts as a receptacle for problem loans
and related assets, its very existence aids the liquidity of the
bank. When the bank finances the affiliate, however, the illiquid-
ity simply becomes disguised. The mere existence of the affiliate
could reduce the caution exercised by bank management. 4
Evidence that some banks had diverted customer deposits into
unsound investments by financing underwritings added a sensa-
tional note to the hearings.2 5 The credibility of assertions by bank-
ers who testified that such abuses were very rare was shattered by
the fact that over 4,000 banks failed during the course of the hear-
ings.2 6 Two banking practices were of particular concern to the
committee: the sale of securities underwritten by the security affili-
ate to the bank's trust accounts and correspondent banks, and the
24. 1931 Hearings, supra note 5, at 1058, 1063-64.
25. Note, supra note 2, at 748.
26. Id.
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use of bank loans to finance the affiliate's underwriting activities.27
Amidst a storm of lobbying and acrimonious personal ex-
changes,'28 a compromise bill was introduced in the Senate on Jan-
uary 21, 1932.29 Debate continued through filibuster and the Nov-
ember election of Roosevelt; Glass reintroduced a similar bill in
January 1933. Willis told Glass to "get as much as you can now
and we can amend the bill later if necessary."0 In January, 1933,
the Glass Banking Bill passed the Senate by a margin of fifty-four
to nine.-" Glass, through the passage of this bill, had set out to
confine bankers to the banking business, to subject them to addi-
tional governmental regulation, and to promote the unification of
banks through permission to conduct branch banking.2 The basic
purposes of the legislation were to restore public confidence in
commercial banks, to promote economic stability and to eliminate
conflicts of interest.3
When the bill reached the House, Representative Steagall op-
posed unification, and sought to protect depositors by federal guar-
antees, thereby culminating efforts for a cause that he had champi-
oned for some twenty years.3 4 Steagall's quest for deposit
guarantees met with success in the House and by the end of May,
1933, the Glass Bill and the Steagall version, which was the basis
for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, were sent to con-
ference.3 5 Glass himself was not pleased with Steagall's changes,
but at the advancing age of seventy-five, and increasingly sour on
the New Deal, he acquiesced." In conference, the Act was modified
as to the Senate's plan for branch bankinpg. The compromise bill
was changed markedly by the addition of deposit insurance.3 7
Roosevelt was not enthusiastic; he almost vetoed the bill because it
27. Rogowski, supra note 10, at 158; 1931 Hearings, supra note 5, at 1063-68.
28. Note, The Glass-Steagall Banking Act of 1933, 47 HARV. L. REV. 325, 326 (1933).
29. 75 CONG. REC. 2403 (1932).
30. Perkins, supra note 2, at 519 n. 75 (citing letter from Willis to Glass, Nov. 19, 1932).
31. S. 4412, 72d Cong., 2d Sess., 76 CONG. REC. 2517 (1933).
32. 75 CONG. REC. 9912-15 (1932).
33. 75 CONG. REC. 9882-84 (1932).
34. 77 CONG. REC. 5895 (1933).
35. The House version passed 262-19 on May 23, 1933, 77 CONG. REC. 4058 (1933), and
went to conference two days later. Id. at 4182.
36. See Perkins, supra note 2, at 521. Glass remained jealous of his accomplishments.
When, during the course of his own legislative efforts, the Securities Act of 1933 reached the
floor, he "broke out into a tirade to the effect that he was the proponent of legislation
dealing with banks and their relationship to the sale of securities and that he wanted no
interference with his handling of these issues." Landis, The Legislative History of the Se-
curities Act of 1933, 28 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 29, 44 (1959).
37. 77 CONG. REc. 3835-36 (1933).
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contained the deposit guaranty experiment. According to one com-
mentator, Roosevelt was fully aware of the threat of additional dis-
ruptive hearings, and even though he withdrew his support of the
legislation under pressure from bank lobbyists, he nevertheless
signed the Act as it emerged from conference to thwart further
hearings and to placate what had become, by that time, a thor-
oughly disenchanted public.8 In fact, public acrimony and concern
were so widespread that seven of ten security affiliates were volun-
tarily liquidated before passage of the Act. 9
As enacted into law, effective June 14, 1934, the Act separated
investment banking and commercial banking," established the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,41 restricted the use of
bank credit for speculation,' established new minimum capital for
national banks,43 and permitted savings banks and Morris Plan
banks to become members of the Federal Reserve System."
Branch banking became a strictly local issue;45 bank holding com-
panies were required to obtain permission from the Federal Re-
serve Board before voting their holdings; 4' interest was eliminated
on demand deposits; 7 interest on time deposits was subject to reg-
ulation;48 loans by banks to their officers were, prohibited,49 and
bank officers or directors could be removed for violations.50
A discussion of many aspects of this legislation is beyond the
scope of this comment. The focus here is on banking involvement
in the underwriting business.5 1
The principal provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act affecting the
separation of commercial and investment banking are sections 16,
20, 21, and 32. Section 16 revised the McFadden Act to prohibit
national banks and state member banks from purchasing equity
38. Rogowski, supra note 10, at 161, 161 n.25.
39. 77 CONG. REc. 3955 (1933).
40. 48 Stat. 162, at §§ 16,20,21,32.
41. Id. at § 8.
42. Id. at §§ 11, 16.
43. Id. at § 17.
44. Id. at § 5. Morris Plan banks were the forerunners of present day credit unions.
45. Id. at § 23.
46. Id. at § 19.
47. Id. at § 11.
48. Id. at § 16.
49. Id. at § 12.
50. Id. at § 30.
51. For a thorough discussion of other aspects of bank involvement in the securities bus-
iness, see Securities Industry Association, Bank Securities Activities: Memorandum for
Study and Discussion, 14 SAN DIEGO L. Rav. 751 (1977).
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securities for their own account.5 2 Limitations are imposed on a
bank's investment authority with respect to debt instruments. 3
Banks are prohibited from underwriting securities except for obli-
gations of the federal government and general obligations of states
and municipalities."4 Commercial banks are limited to three nar-
row areas of the securities business; agency, investment portfolio,
and federal, state, and municipal bonds traded for their own ac-
count.5 Section 16 was amended in 1935 to clarify the position
"that a national bank may buy stock for the account of customers
but not for its own account. 56
Section 20 prohibits the establishment of security affiliates, 57 if
such affiliate is "engaged principally in the issue, flotation, under-
writing, public sale, or distribution at wholesale or retail or
through syndicate participation of stocks, bonds, debentures, notes
or other securities. '" Section 21 provides that an investment bank
may not engage in commercial bank activities.5 9 Section 32 pre-
vents interlocking and overlapping personnel relationships. No
partner, employee or officer of an investment bank may serve as an
officer, director or employee of a commercial bank. 0 These four
key provisions affecting commercial-investment banking relation-
ships should be considered in connection with the structure of the
investment banking industry.
III. INVESTMENT BANKING: THEN AND Now
In 1908 "the first security affiliate on record was organized by
the First National Bank of New York City,""' and its method of
creating a subsidiary was adopted by many banks in organizing
their own affiliates.2 The First Security Co. was organized as a cor-
poration with a capitalization of ten million dollars, equal to that
52. 48 Stat. 162, at §§ 16,20; Clark & Saunders, Judicial Interpetaion of Glass-Steagall:
The Need for Legislative Action, 97 BANKING L.J. 721, 727 (1980).
53. 48 Stat. 162, at § 8; Clark & Saunders, supra note 52, at 727.
54. 48 Stat. 162, at §§ 16,20; Clark & Saunders, supra note 52, at 727.
55. 48 Stat. 162, at §§ 16,20; Clark & Saunders, supra note 52, at 727.
56. Banking Act of 1935: Hearings before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Banking and
Currency on S. 1715 & H.R. 7617, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1935) (section 307(a)).
57. Clark & Saunders, supra note 52, at 726.
58. 48 Stat. 162, at § 20.
59. Id. at § 21.
60. Id. at § 32; Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441
(1947); Clark & Saunders, supra note 52, at 726-27.
61. 1931 Hearings, supra note 5, at 1052; See also 75 CONG. REc. 9909 (1932).
62. 1931 Hearings, supra note 5, at 1052.
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of the bank."' The bank then declared a cash dividend of 100%
but it was not dispersed to the stockholders. With the stockholders
prior approval, this initial capitalization was directly subscribed to
the stock of the affiliate and was deposited under a trust of which
six officers of the bank were made trustees. The bank's sharehold-
ers then had inscribed on their stock certificates a statement that
they had a beneficial interest in an equal number of shares in the
affiliate, inseparable from those of the bank." The trustees were to
exercise the powers of ownership, elect the same directors as that
of the bank and collect dividends for distribution to shareholders. 5
"The National City Bank, also of New York City, followed the lead
of the First National Bank in 1911, and during the following dec-
ade, most of the other large banks in the city and in other money
centers followed suit.""
Other methods of forming securities affiliates included shares
sold in units in combination with shares of the bank, a controlling
interest held by the same interests which controlled the bank, and
a controlling interest held by another security affiliate of the
bank. In most cases these security affiliates engaged in a wide
range of activities. They could act diversely as: wholesalers of se-
curities issues, retailers of securities, holding companies, invest-
ment trusts, loan liquidation companies, as a medium for market-
ing the bank's stock, and as real estate holding companies.6 8 The
wholesale underwriting of securities at times caused security affili-
ates to carry large unsold commitments. At the end of 1930, for
example, several large security affiliates each had several million
dollars of unsold commitments in Bethlehem Steel Corporation
common stock, some eight hundred thousand shares of which were
underwritten in 1929. The offering price to stockholders had been
$110 per share, and at the end of 1930 the unsold commitment had
reduced in value by sixty percent. 9
The rise in commercial bank involvement with investment bank-
ing was evident. "By 1922 there were 62 commercial banks directly
engaged in investment banking and 10 others had formed security
63. Id. (emphasis added).
64. Id. at 1052-53.
65. Id. at 1053 George F. Baker, president of the First National Bank, explained this
technique in a letter to shareholders which is reproduced in its entirety in the record of the
1931 hearings at 1053.
66. 1931 Hearings, supra note 5, at 1054; See also 75 CONG. REc. 9909 (1932).
67. 1931 Hearings, supra note 5, at 1054.
68. Id. at 1057.
69. Id. at 1057-58.
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affiliates for that purpose. . . . In New York this movement was
headed by the First National Bank, Chase National Bank, Na-
tional City Bank, and the Guaranty Trust Co.; in Boston the lead-
ers were the Old Colony Trust Co. and the First National Bank. 70
However, prior to 1927 private banking houses such as J.P. Mor-
gan & Co. and Kuhn Loeb & Co. controlled about eighty percent of
the business. 7' After the passage of the McFadden Act in 1927, the
movement toward broad distributing and elaborate merchandising
by security affiliates became widespread.72 This remarkable change
in the composition of the industry can be seen in Exhibit I.
EXHIBIT I
Underwriting of Investment Securities*
Originated in Participated in
1927 1930 1927 1930
Percent Percent Percent Percent
Private banks, etc. 78.0 55.4 63.2 38.8
Commercial bank
affiliates 12.8 39.2 20.6 54.4
Commercial banks 9.2 5.4 16.2 6.8
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
*Source: 77 Cong. Rec. 3955 (1933).
The major banks generally were the only banks engaged in origi-
nation and underwriting because securities issues were ordinarily
in the millions of dollars." By 1930, the most conspicuous under-
writing firms were National City Co., New York and Chase Harris
Forbes Corporation, New York; First National Old Colony Corpo-
ration, Boston; Continental Illinois Co., Chicago; Bancamerica-
Blair Corporation, New York; Bancamerica Co., San Francisco;
First Detroit Co., Detroit; Guaranty Co., New York; Security First
National Co., Los Angeles and First Chicago Corporation, Chi-
cago. 4 Some banks became so aggressive that they acquired pri-
vate distributing houses to form their security affiliates, such as
when Blair & Co. sold out to the Bank of America in New York
and W.R. Compton & Co. sold out to Chatham Phenix National
70. Perkins, supra note 2, at 492 (footnote ommitted).
71. 77 CONG. REc. at 3955 (1933).
72. 77 CONG. REC. 3954 (1933). See also 75 CONG. REc. 9910 (1933).
73. 75 CONG. REC. at 9909 (1932).
74. Id. at 9909-10.
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Bank & Trust Co., New York.75
At the peak of investment banking activities in 1929, there were
approximately three hundred security affiliates, of which two hun-
dred belonged to national banks, seventy to state bank members of
the Federal Reserve System, and thirty to non-member banks.76
The magnitude of these securities operations has been over-
looked by commentators and historians alike. A glimpse of the sig-
nificance of these security affiliates to the overall success and prof-
itability of major banks can be gleaned from unrehearsed
testimony. For example, Albert H. Wiggin, generally regarded as
the guiding force behind the modern Chase Manhattan Bank, was
president of Chase National Bank during the heyday of security
affiliate activity. During hearings pursuant to Senate Resolutions
84 and 56,7 conducted in 1933 after passage of the Glass-Steagall
Act, the following discourse took place:
[Mr. WIGGIN.] The Chase Securties [sic] Corporation was or-
ganized in 1917. Its original capital was $2,500,000, and was, in
effect, a dividend from the bank to its stockholders. And in order
that there can be no question of where profits went, where the
organizations were so closely allied, the equities were exactly the
same. Each share of Chase National Bank stock carried with it a
share of the Chase Securities Corporation.
The CHAIRMAN. And what was the capital?
Mr. WIGGIN. When the Chase Securities Corporation was
originally started it was 2 1/2 million dollars. In December of 1930,
the high point in the banking business, the capital of the Securi-
ties Co. was 95 million dollars and the surplus was 13 million
dollars.
... It might interest you to know that the total offerings of the
Securities Co., the total issues that they offered, have amounted
to $6,158,000,000.8
At the end of 1928 the capital of the bank was $60 million with a
75. Id. at 9910.
76. Id.
77. Senate Resolution 84 was a resolution to investigate practices of the stock exchange
with respect to the buying and selling and the borrowing and lending of listed securities of
the 72d Congress. Senate Resolution 56 was a resolution to investigate the the matter of
banking operations and practices, the issuance and sale of securities and the trading therein
of the 73d Congress.
78. 1933 Hearings, supra note 22, at 2281-82.
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surplus of $60 million. 9 By 1933 Chase was the largest bank in the
world.80
The importance of investment banking to commercial banks
before Glass-Steagall is further underscored by data developed in
the House during the course of deliberations over the banking leg-
islation. During the years 1922-31, $74 billion of new issues were
sold. In 1924, for example, annual commercial loan volume was
about $8 billion and new issues were about one-half that amount.
In contrast, by 1929 commercial loan volume had increased to only
$9 billion while new issues had increased to $10 billion. 1 Invest-
ment banking had become more important to the long-term financ-
ing of industry than commercial banking. Large money center
commercial banks were fully cognizant of and participated in this
development. By 1930 commercial bank security affiliates had be-
come the major factor in investment banking.8 2 The industry trade
association (The Investment Bankers Association) was headed by
security affiliate personnel during this era. 3
That banks appear to have neglected commercial banking in
favor of investment banking is evidenced in part by data gathered
for Congress concerning bank failures. During the period 1921-32,
10,500 banks failed. This represented more than one-third of the
then existing banks.84 Banks in existence as of December 30, 1932,
are shown in Exhibit II. Of this total, approximately 6,900 banks
were members of the Federal Reserve System. 5 During this time
Canada experienced twenty-six bank failures; while England and
Scotland experienced none.8 6 Banks in these countries were totally
separate from investment functions.
79. Id. at 2285.
80. Id. at 2280-81. The bank made several important acquisitions, and by early 1930
reported total capital and surplus of $243 million. Wall St. J., Mar. 27, 1933, at 15. The
capital and surplus of National City Bank at this time was $242 million. Id.
81. 77 CONG. Rc. at 3957 (1933).
82. Perkins, supra note 2, at 495. See also supra Exhibit I.
83. Perkins, supra note 2, at 496.
84. 77 CONG. REc. at 3949 (1933).
85. Id. at 3841, 3949-50.
86. Id. at 3950.
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EXHIBIT II
United States Banks*
December 30, 1932
Number of Deposits, Exclusive
Reporting Banks of Interbank Deposits
National Banks 6,011 $16,101,264
State & Private Banks 12,379 25,541,418
18,390 $41,642,682
*Source: 77 Cong. Rec. 3841 (1933).
During this era private investment banks prospered. A brief pro-
file of the leaders of the business follows.
J.P. Morgan & Co.-The "Tiffany" of the investment banking
business conducted its activities on a wholesale basis and had no
distributive facilities for securities. The firm had no branches or
offices in locations other than Drexel & Co. in Philadelphia. The
firm did conduct a general banking business but separated upon
enactment of the Glass-Steagall Act into J.P. Morgan & Co., which
continued commercial banking activities, and Morgan Stanley &
Co., which continued investment banking activities.8 7 The House
of Morgan was and is the most powerful factor in the investment
banking business. During hearings conducted in connection with
the banking legislation, the appearance of J.P. Morgan himself
usually brought the gallery to its feet. 8 His personage became a
ready target for populists such as Senator Huey Long, (D.-
Louisiana) ."
87. United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621, 655-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). See also Morgan
Stanley 1973 (anniversary brochure) (Rubenstein, Wolfson & Co., Inc. 1973).
88. 1933 Hearings, supra note 22, at 3-4.
89. For example:
[Mr. LONG.] Mr. President, this disclosure as to the House of Morgan, and as
to the financial market-rigging set-up of this country and of the whole world,
shows that they have taken the prospective persons of influence, the great and the
near-great and the maybe-to-be great, and have absorbed them in the incubator.
They have reached them in their days of youth and in their days of growing prom-
ise. They have bandaged them and they have banded them. They have given them
the balm of Gilead that the House of Morgan gives only to the select, and those
whose services may be of some benefit to the country, so that when the fateful
hour may have arrived no man will have escaped the confidence of the house
through which he has been a recipient of the blessings of this kind of conduct,
assuming, therefore, that he will be in no position to do anything to upset it if he
reaches a place of power in the life of the Government where he might be of ser-
vice to the people.
77 CONG. REC. at 4260.
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Field, Glore & Co.-Formed in 1920 as Marshall Field, Glore,
Ward & Co., it conducted a general investment banking business in
Chicago. Marshall Field III retired from the partnership in 1937,
and the company became known as Glore, Forgan & Co. The firm
principally engaged in the origination and underwriting of corpo-
rate securities 90
Dillon Read & Co., Inc.-Commencing business in 1913 as Wm.
A. Read & Co., this firm became Dillon Read in 1922 and was pri-
marily an underwriting manager. It assembled a relatively small
group of aggressive individuals who rapidly built the firm to a posi-
tion of leadership in the investment banking business. Among
these men were Clarence Dillon, James V. Forrestal, William H.
Draper, Jr., and later, C. Douglas Dillon. 1
Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co.-The forerunner of this
major investment banking firm was organized as Edward B. Smith
& Co. in 1873. It conducted a general investment banking business
at the time of the enactment of Glass-Steagall and was a large or-
ganization for the era, with total personnel of about five hundred.92
Kidder Peabody & Co., Inc.-This firm was founded in 1865,
and was very active in the utilities business. Kidder also was active
in providing services to foreign governments. In 1934 Kidder took
over the Office of the Security Affiliate of Philadelphia National
Bank and most of its employees. Personnel from Guaranty, Chase
and National City also joined Kidder.93
Blyth Eastman Paine Webber Inc.-Eastman Dillon & Co. was
founded in 1910, and was active in the Pennsylvania area with a
total of thirteen partners in 1929."" Blyth & Co., Inc. was formed in
1914 as Blyth Witter & Co. In 1924 the firm separated into Dean
Witter & Co. and Blyth. Both firms specialized in the representa-
tion of west coast firms, principally utility companies.9 5 Union Se-
curities Corp. was formed in 1938.6 These firms combined and
merged over the years and were the base of the present Blyth
Eastman Paine Webber.
Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb, Inc.-Kuhn Loeb & Co. was
90. What An Investment Banker Can Do For You (1960) (Glore, Forgan & Co. 1920-
1960, fortieth anniversary booklet).
91. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. at 671-72.
92. Id. at 658-61.
93. Id. at 663-65.
94. Id. at 668-69.
95. Id. at 672-75.
96. Id. at 678-80; S. BIRMINGHAM, OUR CROWD-THE GREAT JEWISH FAMILIES OF NEW
YORK, 132-67 (1967).
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founded in New York City in 1867 and for many years was strictly
a family affair whose partners included Jacob Schiff, Felix
Warburg, Otto H. Kahn, and Mortimer Schiff. It was not until
1911 that the first partner who was not related by marriage or oth-
erwise was hired. Elisha Walker and Hugh Knowlton became part-
ners in 1933. The firm was historically associated with the growth
of railroads."'
Lehman Brothers, formed in 1850, has always been an important
factor in the investment banking business and members of its fam-
ily were leading partners. These included Robert, Philip, Arthur,
Harold, Allan, and Herbert. The firm acted in all capacities for is-
suers in the field of negotiated transactions. Commencing in 1906,
the firm entered into an informal partnership with Goldman Sachs
that lasted for twenty years. 8 Lehman and Kuhn Loeb combined
forces in 1976.
Goldman Sachs & Co.-This firm was founded in 1869 by Mar-
cus Goldman. Samuel Sachs joined him as a partner in 1882. Sid-
ney J. Weinberg became a partner in 1927. The principal business
of the firm was commercial paper, brokerage, and investment
banking.'9
Merrill Lynch White Weld Capital Markets Group-White
Weld & Co. was formed in 1895 and was engaged in block trading
as well as a general brokerage and underwriting business. White
Weld made a specialty of private placements and the long term
positioning of the securities of foundling companies.100
Other firms active in the underwriting business during these
years included G.E. Barrett & Co.; Hallgarten & Co.; Hornblower
& Weeks; Halsey, Stuart & Co.; Otis & Co.; and E.H. Rollins & Co.
The modern investment banking business bears little resem-
blance to activities of the 1922-31 period. This is due principally to
the revolution that has taken place in the financial services indus-
try, largely without legislation.101 While many of the names of im-
portant financial institutions are the same, the proliferation of
products and variety of services offered to the investor has created
far-reaching changes in the industry.
Investment was separated from commercial banking on June 16,
1934. No less than five major investment banking firms trace their
97. See BIRMINGHAM, supra note 96, at 176-84, 401-13.
98. Id. at 358-67; Morgan, 118 F. Supp. at 661-63.
99. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. at 665-67; See also BIRMINGHAM, supra note 96, at 362-65.
100. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. at 667-68.
101. 14 Sc. REG. & L.REp. (BNA) 70 (Jan. 13, 1982).
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origins directly to the separation which occurred at that time.
These include, in addition to Morgan Stanley & Co., The First
Boston Corporation; Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co.; Drexel
Burnham Lambert, Inc.; and Blyth Eastman Paine Webber, Inc.
The First National Bank of Boston and Chase National Bank in
New York entered into a complex arrangement whereby First Bos-
ton was spun off from the First National Bank of Boston, effective
June 16, 1934. This new public company retained an option, which
it exercised, to acquire Harris Forbes & Co., part of the security
affiliate of Chase. Many key employees of the Chase security affili-
ate became key employees of First Boston.102 Today First Boston
ranks as one of the most prestigious investment banking firms in
the world, and has been particularly effective in the field of merg-
ers and acquisitions.'
On June 16, 1934, several key employees of the security affiliate
of Guaranty Trust Company, along with several hundred other em-
ployees, joined Edward B. Smith & Co., the predecessor of Smith
Barney. Today Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. is one of the
leading investment banking firms in the United States.10 4
Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. traces its origins to the Philadel-
phia partnership affiliate of J.P. Morgan & Co., and the firm of
Harriman Ripley & Co., Inc., which came into existence after the
security affiliate of National City Bank liquidated and its princi-
pals formed the predecessor partnership to Harriman Ripley.
Through subsequent mergers and acquisitions, Drexel Burnham
Lambert has acquired a significant European business and is a
leading underwriter of American securities.
Blyth Eastman Paine Webber, Inc. includes the original firms of
Union Securities, Eastman Dillon, Blyth, and Paine Webber Jack-
son & Curtis. Its commercial banking connections included key
former officers of National City Company, the security affiliate of
National City Bank of New York and key personnel from Conti-
nental Illinois Bank and Trust of Chicago.'03
During the 1960's underwriting originations were concentrated
among a few powerful firms. Morgan Stanley, First Boston, Kuhn
Loeb, and Dillon Read were considered the power structure and
102. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. at 669-71.
103. Wall St. J., Jan. 14, 1983, at 24. (advertisement)
104. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. at 658-61; Schneider, Evolving Proof Standards Under Sec-
tion 7 and Mergers in Transitional Markets: The Securities Industry Example, 81 Wis.
L.REv. 1, 69 n. 254 (1981).
105. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. at 675-77.
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were known as the "special bracket."'  At the beginning of the
sixties origination firms possessed strong bargaining power.10 7 Be-
ginning in the early seventies growth in the importance of market-
ing securities provided increased investment banking opportunities
for firms capable of broad distribution. Thus, today's special
bracket includes Morgan Stanley, The First Boston Corporation,
Merrill Lynch White Weld Capital Markets Group, Goldman
Sachs & Co., and Salomon Brothers Inc.,108 representing an amal-
gam of origination and distribution power.
The balance of the firms that dominate the investment banking
industry today are as follows: Bear, Stearns & Co.; Blyth Eastman
Paine Webber, Inc.; Dillon Read & Co., Inc.; Donaldson, Lufkin &
Jenrette Securities Corp.; Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc.; E.F.
Hutton & Co., Inc.; Kidder, Peabody & Co.; Lazard Freres & Co.;
Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb, Inc.; Prudential-Bache Securities;
L.F. Rothschild, Unterberg, Towbin; Shearson/American Express
Inc.; Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co.; Warburg Paribas Beck-
er; Wertheim & Co., Inc.; and Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. These
sixteen firms plus the five investment bankers of the special brack-
et account for approximately ninety percent of all corporate under-
writing activity in the United States.10 9
In 1981, the latest year for which data is available, the ten
largest firms ranked as follows:
106. Schneider, supra note 104, at 61, 65 n. 240. The characterization of a firm as an
investment banker has traditionally related to its origination activities. Origination de-
scribes the process by which an underwriter develops the business and lead manages the
ensuing underwriting. An integral part of the origination function is financial planning and
forecasting with, and on behalf of, the client corporation. It is only after completion of this
extensive financial analysis that conventional underwriting activity commences, which in-
cludes the preparation of registration statements, pricing, timing, organizing and managing
the underwriting and distribution syndicate. The "special bracket" has traditionally re-
ferred to the most powerful originators in terms of dollar volume of underwritings managed.
107. Id. at 61-2.
108. Id. at 65. Both Dillon Read and Kuhn Loeb have been dropped.
109. Comment, Professional Responsibility, Due Diligence, and Rule 415: Another Di-
lemma, 10 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 619, 635 (1983).
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EXHIBIT III*
Firm Underwritings Managed**
(millions)
Merrill Lynch $8,276
Morgan Stanley 8,107
Salomon Brothers 6,000
Goldman, Sachs 5,972
First Boston 5,508
Lehman Brothers 4,508
Kidder, Peabody 2,575
Blyth Eastman 2,331
Dean Witter 2,221
Drexel Burnham Lambert 1,784
*Source: Corporate Financing Directory, Investment Dealers' Digest, Mar. 16, 1982, at 11.
**All managers given equal proportionate credit in comanagerships.
Note that the five special bracket firms rank as the five largest
investment banks as measured by dollar volume of underwritings
managed.
Immediately after the enactment of Glass-Steagall, the aggregate
capital of private investment banks was, in all probability, less
than $100 million. Yet just one security affiliate of the three hun-
dred in existence at the time, Chase, had capital of $110 million. l10
Today the investment banking industry is well capitalized as a re-
sult of mergers, public offerings, and decades of industry prosper-
ity. Capital of the largest firms is as follows:
EXHIBIT IV*
Firm Capital
(Millions)
Merrill Lynch White Weld $1,264
E.F. Hutton 534
Shearson/American Express 527
Prudential-Bache 389
Dean Witter Reynolds 306
Paine Webber 240
*Source: Business Week, 12-20-82, p. 54.
110. 75 CONG. REc. 9910 (1932).
111. How They Manage the New Financial Supermarkets, Bus. WK. 54 (Dec. 20, 1982)
[hereinafter cited as Financial Supermarket].
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Morgan Stanley has capital of $220 million, Dillon Read about
$35 million." 2 While this modern industry capital base pales in
light of the assets controlled by the major commercial banks, s it
represents an impressive advance over June 16, 1934, or even
1950.114
Although senior managers in investment firms are few in num-
ber, as compared to the commercial banking industry, they consti-
tute a disproportionate percentage of governmental leaders. After
Glass-Steagall, the investment banking industry recruited directly
from institutions such as Harvard Business School and also at-
tracted prominent industrialists as partners. In recent years, the
industry has provided members of the Federal Reserve Board,
Treasury Department, Securities and Exchange Commission, Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, the military and both houses of Con-
gress." 5 More recently, the Chairman of Merrill Lynch became
Treasury Secretary, a key cabinet post."' This contribution to gov-
ernment, while not entirely unique to investment bankers, con-
trasts with the testimony of the 1931 and 1933 hearings, and the
stereotype of the contemporary commercial banker."
7
IV. CIRCUMVENTION
Shortly after the passage of Glass-Steagall, commercial banks
commenced a steady incursion back into the securities business. In
1935, section 16 of the Act was amended to make it clear that
112. Carrington, Dillon Read Denies Bechtel Stake Rumors, Sets Move to Midtown
New York Building, Wall St. J., Dec. 17, 1982, at 10, col. 3-4.
113. Carrington, Drexel's Linton, New Head of SIA, Sees 1983 as Crucial in Face-Off
With Banks, Wall St. J., Nov. 3, 1982, at 14, col. 1-2; Securities Industry Association, supra
note 51, at 784-87; Wall St. J., Dec. 2, 1982, at 46, col. 4.
114. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. at 647.
115. To mention just a few: John Shad, head of E.F. Hutton, became Chairman of the
SEC. William J. Casey, prominent Wall Street investor and securities lawyer was Chairman
of the SEC and subsequently became Director of the CIA. Maurice Stans was President of
Glore Forgan and became Secretary of Commerce. Nicholas Brady, head of Dillon Read,
served as U.S. Senator from New Jersey. Gillis Long, a former partner of Kohlmyer & Co., is
a U.S. States Congressman from Louisiana. William H. Black and Peter Saint Germain,
partners of Morgan Stanley, served with the International Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment. Peter Peterson of Lehman Brothers was Secretary of Commerce. George Ball of
Lehman, currently head of Prudential-Bache, was Under Secretary of State. Henry Fowler
of Goldman Sachs was Treasury Secretary.
116. Donald Regan, Chairman of Merrill Lynch, became Treasury Secretary under Presi-
dent Reagan.
117. For an anecdote on this subject, see Zonana, The Porsches and Saabs at Schwab
Aggravate Some at Bank America, Wall St. J., Jan. 20, 1983, at 27, col. 1-2. See infra note
205, and accompanying text.
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banks could buy stock for the account of a customer. " ' Since 1934,
nine attempts have been made to pass legislation permitting banks
to underwrite nonrevenue bonds. " 9 Bills were proposed to rescind
the underwriting prohibition on corporate bonds in 1935 and
1938.2 Attempts to permit banks to underwrite new United
States or other governmental agency securities were successful.
Bonds of the Federal Housing Administration were approved for
bank underwriting in 1935.121 Federal National Mortgager Associa-
tion Bonds were approved in 1938.122 World Bank Bonds were ap-
proved in 1949.123 In that same year, local public housing bonds
were approved.'2 4 Bonds for the Central Bank for Cooperatives
were approved in 1954.125 In 1959, Tennessee Valley Authority
Bonds and Inter-American Development Bank Bonds were ap-
proved. 26 Legislation has been introduced eight times since 1938
to permit bank underwriting of all revenue bonds. 127
On another front, banks found from operating under the holding
company format, that many activities that were held to be non-
bank activities could be performed indirectly by a non-bank sub-
sidiary of the holding company.1 8 Fearing circumvention of the
Glass-Steagall Act, Congress enacted the Bank Holding Company
Act of 1956 which was intended to separate banking from assets
having no close relationship to banking. 129 Under the Act, mul-
tibank holding companies were required to divest many non-bank-
ing activities. 30
In 1961, James J. Saxon, a supporter of bank expansion, was ap-
pointed Comptroller of the Currency.1 ' Saxon believed that in-
creased bank flexibility would improve the competitive posture of
118. Camp, 401 U.S. at 624 n.10; Note, Glass-Steagall Act - A History of its Legislative
Origins and Regulatory Construction, 92 BANKING L.J. 38, 42 (1975).
119. Rogowski, supra note 10, at 162.
120. Id.
121. Banking Act of 1935, ch. 614, 49 Stat. 709 (1935).
122. National Housing Act Amendments of 1938, ch. 13, 52 Stat. 26 (1938).
123. National Housing Act, ch. 276, 63 Stat. 298 (1949).
124. Housing Act of 1949, ch. 338, 63 Stat. 439 (1949).
125. Ch. 834, 68 Stat. 771 (1954).
126. Pub. L. No. 137, 73 Stat. 285 (1959); Pub. L. No. 147, 73 Stat. 301 (1959).
127. Rogowski, supra note 10, at 164.
128. Comment, Expansion of National Bank Powers: Regulatory and Judicial Prece-
dent Under the National Bank Act, Glass-Steagall Act, and Bank Holding Company Act,
36 Sw. L.J. 765, 785 (1982).
129. Securities Industry Association, supra note 51, at 804; Comment, supra note 128, at
785; Note, supra note 23, at 988.
130. Comment, supra note 128, at 785-86.
131. Id. at 770.
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banks. He authorized national banks to engage in the insurance
business, courier services, data processing, leasing, and the travel
agency business. 32 Then, in 1962, Congress transferred jurisdiction
of most of the trust activities of national banks from the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System to the Comptroller of the
Currency. 133
During the 1960's, many one-bank holding companies emerged,
creating a loophole between the Holding Company Act and the
Glass-Steagall Act. These new holding companies were not "mul-
tibank," subject to the 1956 Act, nor "bank," subject to Glass-
Steagall or the National Bank Act. Congress responded with the
Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970.3. These
amendments reflected the same congressional concerns as those ex-
pressed in the formulation of the 1956 Act, and in addition, con-
cern over concentration of economic power in bank holding compa-
nies.13' The primary purpose of the amendments was to close the
one-bank holding company loophole and preserve the basic separa-
tion of bank activities from other business activities.130 In these
amendments, Congress rejected a proposal to create a list enumer-
ating permissible activities, but instead permitted non-bank sub-
sidiaries of bank holding companies to engage in activities that are
"so closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks as
to be a proper incident thereto.' 3 7
After the passage of the 1970 amendments, banks and bank
holding companies made a concerted effort to enter the business of
investment management. 13 8 Also during the 1970's, foreign banks
made significant inroads into the investment banking business
through the establishment or acquisition of interests in security af-
filiates. During this period, twenty-eight major foreign banks en-
tered the securities industry in this fashion.139 Another significant
post-amendment trend involved the aggressive movement by banks
into private placement activity, either directly or through bank
holding companies.'4 0 The Comptroller and the Federal Reserve
132. Id.
133. Camp, 401 U.S. at 621.
134. Pub. L. No. 91-607, 84 Stat. 1760 (1970) (amending 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-49 (1964)).
135. 115 CONG. REc. 32,893, 32,903 (1969).
136. Id. at 32,890. See Hearings on H.R. 6778 Before the House Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 197 (1969).
137. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1976).
138. Note, supra note 23, at 991.
139. Securities Industry Association, supra note 51, at 820-22 app. V.
140. In a private placement, a company wanting to raise capital will place its securities
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Board have concluded that private placement activity where the
bank acts as placement agent lies outside the reach of the Glass-
Steagall Act."' A Federal Reserve study released in 1977 had re-
versed earlier positions of the Board and the Comptroller. The
study expressed the view that private placement activity does not
expose a commercial bank to the risks of fluctuating securities val-
ues which the Glass-Steagall Act was designed to prevent.1 42 Com-
mercial banks account for a significant percentage of the aggregate
placement activity. 43 Particularly active in this field are Citibank,
First National Bank of Chicago, Northern Trust Company, and
Chase Manhattan Bank, the same banks who were active prior to
the Glass-Steagall Act., 4
Due to the specific exemption provided commercial banks
through section 16, banks have been permitted to underwrite and
distribute U.S. government securities and general obligations of
states and subdivisions. 45 In a recent year, commercial banks ac-
counted for an estimated sixty-five percent of total underwriting
activity in this segment of the industry.1 46 The proliferation of new
investment products has enabled banks to become active in a wide
range of investment services and other non-underwriting activities
previously relegated to the securities industry. Commercial banks
apparently seek diversification to obtain higher rates of return on
invested capital and at the same time gain firmer control of corpo-
rate and trust business.
Amidst this tide of legislative and administrative change, the in-
dustry turned to the judiciary. The first Glass-Steagall Act inter-
pretation to reach the Supreme Court was Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System v. Agnew.147 Employees of the part-
nership of Eastman, Dillon & Co. were ordered removed from of-
fice as directors of the Paterson National Bank by the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The Supreme Court up-
directly with a small group of sophisticated investors. This placement might be made di-
rectly by the issuer or through a placement agent. Properly structured, these transactions
are exempt from the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933.
141. Miller, The Participation of National Banks in Private Placements of Corporate
Securities, 13 NEw ENG. L. REV. 63, 77 (1977); Note, supra note 2, at 754-56.
142. See FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, COMMERCIAL BANK PRIVATE PLACEMENT AcTriTEs
(1977) (staff study).
143. See Security Industry Association, supra note 51, at 763-65.
144. Id. at 763 n.22.
145. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
146. Rogowski, supra note 10, at 165.
147. 329 U.S. 441 (1947).
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held the order, relying on section 32 of the Act.14 8 Under section
30, the Board had full power to order the removal. " 9 The Court
strongly endorsed the Glass-Steagall policy divorcing commercial
banks from involvement in the underwriting business. The Court
reinforced the congressional objective of avoiding possible conflicts
of interest:
Section 32 is directed to the probability or likelihood, based on
the experience of the 1920's, that a bank director interested in the
underwriting business may use his influence in the bank to in-
volve it or its customers in securities which his underwriting
house has in its portfolio or has committed itself to take .... It
is a preventive or prophylactic measure. The fact that respon-
dents have been scrupulous in their relationships to the bank is
therefore immaterial.150
The second time that the Supreme Court was called upon to in-
terpret Glass-Steagall was in Investment Company Institute v.
Camp.""' The Supreme Court held that the fund of First National
City Bank was prohibited under sections 16 and 21 of the Act." 2
In examining the legislative intent of the Act, the Court stated:
Congress acted to keep commercial banks out of the investment
banking business largely because it believed that the promotional
incentives of investment banking and the investment banker's pe-
cuniary stake in the success of particular investment opportuni-
ties was destructive of prudent and disinterested commercial
banking and of public confidence in the commercial banking
system." 8
The Court pointed to congressional concern over damage to mem-
ber banks because of direct and indirect involvement in specula-
tive securities. 54 The Court focused on hazards the Congress had
perceived, the most obvious being that a bank might invest its own
funds imprudently. The more subtle hazards included those factors
enumerated during the course of the 1931 Hearings." Based on
148. Id. at 448, 449.
149. Id. at 444.
150. Id. at 447, 449.
151. 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
152. Id. at 639. Clark and Saunders, supra note 52, at 730.
153. Camp, 401 U.S. at 634.
154. Id. at 630.
155. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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the Court's concern over both obvious and subtle hazards, it pro-
hibited bank involvement in pooled investment funds. 5
Other federal courts have had occasion to interpret the Act and
have, until recently, been uniformly adverse to any lessening of the
regulatory framework of the Act. In Russell v. Continental Illinois
National Bank and Trust Co.,"'7 the Seventh Circuit held that the
purpose of the Act was to minimize the risk of loss or insolvency to
a bank, to maintain confidence in the bank system, and to protect
depositors and the public from the hazards and financial dangers
that arise when commercial banks engage in investment banking
activities.158 The court observed that there is no express statutory
authorization for private action in the Act. "
In Port of New York Authority v. Baker, Watts & Co.,1 60 the
court held that bonds issued by the Port Authority were obliga-
tions secured by all its resources but not by its taxing power. Con-
sequently they were not within the general obligations section of
the Act.161 The court reviewed the debates and reiterated the con-
gressional intent to confine banks to the underwriting of general
obligations requiring tax support.""
In New York Stock Exchange, Inc. v. Bloom,"" the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals declined to rule on the legality of auto-
matic stock purchase services claiming that the challenged opin-
ions of the Comptroller were not ripe for judicial scrutiny. ' " In so
holding, the court vacated the district court's earlier decision in
New York Stock Exchange, Inc. v. Smith,1 5 which had upheld the
validity of such stock purchasing services.
Two recent cases may signal a change in this uniformly strict
interpretation of Glass-Steagall. In Board of Governors of Federal
Reserve System v. Investment Company Institute,166 the Supreme
Court considered a bank activity similar to that prohibited in
156. Camp, 401 U.S. at 639. See Clark and Saunders, supra note 52, at 732.
157. 479 F.2d 131 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1040 (1973).
158. Id. at 133-34.
159. Id. at 134.
160. 392 F.2d 497 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
161. Id. at 504.
162. Id. at 502. The Court pointed out that in the previous thirteen years, seven at-
tempts to allow bank underwriting of obligations not secured by the taxing power had been
made, but no legislation was enacted. Id. at 503.
163. 562 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. New York Stock Exchange v.
Heimann Inc., 435 U.S. 942 (1978).
164. Id. at 743.
165. 404 F. Supp. 1091 (D.D.C. 1975).
166. 450 U.S. 46 (1981).
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Camp. In Camp, a broad definition of the term "security" permit-
ted the Court to prohibit bank involvement in a pooled investment
fund. 16 7 In Investment Company Institute the Court considered
the Board's amendment to Regulation Y, which permitted bank
holding companies and non-banking subsidiaries to act as invest-
ment advisors to closed-end investment companies. The Court
held that the Regulation Y amendments were consistent with the
1970 amendments to the holding company act, overruling the lower
court on this issue. However, the Court agreed with the lower court
by finding that no violation of Glass-Steagall had occurred.
168
The Court gave great deference to the Federal Reserve Boards'
determination of what activities are closely related to banking, and
also deferred to their judgment that benefits to the public out-
weighed possible adverse effects.169 The Court stated that its hold-
ing was consistent with Camp and Glass-Steagall in that "bank af-
filiates may be authorized to engage in certain activities that are
prohibited to banks themselves. ' 17 0 The Court further stated:
"Even if we were to assume that a bank would violate the Glass-
Steagall Act by engaging in certain investment advisory services, it
would not follow that a bank holding company could never per-
form such services.' ' 7 1 The Court further distinguished Camp by
stating that its holding related to a mutual fund which was the
functional equivalent of an open-end investment company,
whereas in this case the authorization was expressly limited to
closed-end investment companies. 172 The Court also stated that
"[i]nvestment advisors and closed-end investment companies are
not 'principally engaged' in the issuance or the underwriting of se-
curities within the meaning of the Glass-Steagall Act. .... ,,"' The
Supreme Court thus appears to have established a significant dis-
tinction on the basis of a bank's organizational structure; the stan-
dard applied to the permissive activities of banks is far more strin-
gent than that applied to the permissive activities of bank holding
companies.
In a case decided in November 1982, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals held that commercial paper is not a security. In
167. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
168. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. at 78.
169. Id. at 56-57.
170. Id. at 60 (footnote omitted).
171. Id. at 63-64.
172. Id. at 64-67.
173. Id. at 71.
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A.G. Becker, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System,1 74 the court took a very narrow definition of security in its
examination of section 16 and 21 of the Act and concluded that a
commercial bank may purchase and sell commercial paper. The
court stated: "Because commercial paper is like a loan rather than
a security, marketing of commercial paper by the bank does not
have the same economic impact on the bank as would marketing of
securities. 1 75 This definition of security appears inconsistent with
earlier pronouncements as to what constitutes a security." 6 An
analysis of the legislative intent behind Glass-Steagall likewise in-
dicates that this definition of security appears inconsistent with
the Act. It is not known whether this decision will be appealed to
the Supreme Court.
Absent new legislation, current developments in the industry
will surely bring significant additional litigation to the judiciary.
The A.G. Becker decision could spur additional industry activity as
commercial banks continue to expand.
V. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
During 1982 Chase Manhattan Bank created a separate invest-
ment banking unit with $175 million of stated capital. 1 7 The bank
may also acquire a major discount brokerage firm."18 The Security
Pacific Bank created a joint venture with Fidelity Brokerage Ser-
vices,17 9 and Bankamerica Corp. announced the acquisition of
Charles Schwab.1 80 Citicorp announced the planned acquisition of
Quick & Reilly."'1 Crocker National Bank announced a joint ven-
ture with Bradford Settlement for clearing of its securities transac-
tions, and Chemical Bank made a similar joint venture arrange-
ment with Pershing & Co.182 J.P. Morgan, Bankers Trust and
174. 693 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1982), af'd on rehearing, 694 F.2d 280 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
175. Id. at 150.
176. See, e.g., SEC v. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary,
Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974). But see United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S.
837 (1975).
177. Wall St. J., Mar. 15, 1982, at 46, col. 4-5.
178. Wall St. J., Feb. 14, 1983, at 4, col. 2-3.
179. Wall St. J., Aug. 27, 1982, at 2, col. 3-4. Subsequently, Security Pacific decided to
acquire a broker directly. Wall St. J., Jan. 6, 1983, at 3, col. 2.
180. Wall St. J., Sept. 23, 1982, at 27, col. 4; Wall St. J., Jan. 10, 1983, at 5, col. 1.
181. Carrington & Gottschalk, Jr., Bank Sorties Into Discount Brokerage Create Wall
St. Fears of an Invasion, Wall St. J., Sept. 2, 1982, at 4, col. 3-4.
182. Id.
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Citicorp have been approved as traders of futures contracts. 88
Union Planters Bank announced the acquisition of Brenner Steed
& Associates. 18 ' United Jersey Banks announced the acquisition of
Richard Blackman & Co. 185 Certain savings and loan associations
have been permitted to enter the brokerage business.186 These
commercial banks have been relying on their interpretation of the
1935 Act.1 87 The Security Industry Association (SIA) has instituted
at least one lawsuit challenging many of the transactions enumer-
ated above. 88
It appears that the only bank-brokerage acquisition which has
been challenged by the Federal Reserve Board is the acquisition by
Dreyfus Corp. of Lincoln State Bank, a small commercial bank in
New Jersey. The Federal Reserve Board maintains that this trans-
action violates the Bank Holding Company Act. 8 9 The controller
has permitted Dreyfus to establish a national bank in New York
City.190
On another front, major financial institutions with insurance
rather than banking as their basic business have announced sub-
stantial acquisitions in the securities industry. For example, the
Kemper Group has acquired Prescott Ball & Turben, Loewi & Co.,
and Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc.' 9' Further, Sears Roe-
buck & Co. acquired Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. in 1981. This
combination is expected to challenge Merrill Lynch, presently the
largest investment supermarket in the world. 92
Shearson's capital base prior to its acquisition by American Ex-
press was approximately $500 million. Now it is allied with Ameri-
can Express' $22 billion in assets. Likewise, Prudential paid $385
million for Bache, allied with Prudential's $60 billion in assets.'93
All of this merger, acquisition and expansion activity does not ap-
183. Wall St. J., Dec. 2, 1982, at 46, col. 4.
184. Wall St. J., Sept. 23, 1982, at 27, col. 4.
185. Wall St. J., Nov. 18, 1982, at 3, col. 1.
186. See Carrington & Gottshalk, supra note 181.
187. See supra note 56.
188. See Carrington & Gottshalk, supra note 181; Wall St. J., Jan. 18, 1983, at 12, col. 3,
Wall St. J., Feb. 4, 1983, at 41, col. 1.
189. Wall St. J., Dec. 14, 1982, at 2, col. 2; Id. Dec. 28, 1982, at 4, col. 3; Bus. WK., Dec.
27, 1982 at 36.
190. Wall St. J., Feb. 8, 1983, at 2, col. 3-4.
191. See, e.g., Ingrassia, Kemper Corp. to Buy 80% of Prescott Ball for Cash and Stock
Valued at $64 Million, Wall St. J., Sept. 2, 1982, at 5, col. 1-5.
192. See Financial Supermarkets, supra note 111, at 50. Curley, Sears Planning Ads
Touting Financial Units, Wall St. J., Jan. 7, 1983, at 19, col. 3.
193. See Financial Supermarkets, supra note 111 at 51.
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pear to directly involve underwriting activity at this time, but if
commercial bankers' efforts to underwrite revenue bonds are any
indication, there are certain to be incursions concurrent with rapid
expansion into a full range of financial services. This surge of re-
cent activity and consequent pending litigation indicates an urgent
need for a legislative response.
All of this activity and ferment has spawned a new growth in-
dustry-banking consulting. City banks and country banks are ac-
quiring or affiliating with discount brokers. Deregulation of the
banking industry to permit money market accounts and perhaps
money market funds is sure to be challenged by the securities in-
dustry. The recently formed Depository Institutions Regulation
Committee can be expected to actively assist banks in creating
financial products to compete in the securities industry. 94 The
new head of the SIA, Robert Linton, Chairman of Drexel Burnham
Lambert, Inc., believes that legislation is mandatory in this period
of controversy.1 95 The Reagan administration has announced plans
to allow banks to expand securities activities through separate sub-
sidiaries.'9 Such deregulation can be expected to receive broad
support, largely in disregard for the historic problems which have
manifested themselves when commercial banks engage in invest-
ment banking.
The House and the Senate will give careful consideration to
these proposals in 1983. The Senate plans to hold hearings on pro-
posals to let banks underwrite municipal revenue bonds, offer mu-
tual funds, and engage in many other securities activities. 91 The
House, however, plans a broad, detailed review of all of the
financial laws. 198 Senate Banking Committee Chairman, Jake Garn
(R-Utah), has been pressing to deregulate many aspects of bank-
ing, 199 but Chairman of the House Banking, Finance, and Urban
Affairs Committee, Fernand St. Germain (D-Rhode Island), plans
a more detailed and methodical review of the whole area.200
194. Conte, Regan Sees Shake-up in Financial System as Banks S & L's Compete for
Money Funds, Wall St. J., Oct. 7, 1982, at 3, col. 2.
195. Carrington, supra note 113, at col. 1.
196. Carrington, Wall St. Officials Tell Senate Panel Securities Bill Gives Banks Unfair
Edge, Wall St. J., Feb. 11, 1982, at 6, col. 1-3.
197. Carrington, Securities Industry Alerted by Lawmakers On Moves in Early '83 to
Ease Bank Laws, Wall St. J., Dec. 6, 1982, at 7, col. 2-4.
198. Id. at col. 3.
199. Id.; 14 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 70 (Jan. 13, 1982).
200. Carrington, supra note 197, at 7, col. 3; 14 Sac. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 70 (Jan. 13,
1982).
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The securities industry itself is divided on how to meet the vari-
ous threats of increased concentration and competition. 20 ' The new
diversity of ownership of Wall Street firms has created differing
viewpoints. For example, Sears Roebuck's attitude and views are
different from those of Morgan Stanley & Co. This divergence of
ownership and hence attitude has made it difficult for the securi-
ties industry to formulate a united position.0 2 Changes in the
Glass-Steagall Act can be expected.2 03 The foregoing chronology
has been offered to put the upcoming debate into perspective.
VI. PROPOSAL
Additional factors not dealt with by commentators, historians,
the legislature or the judiciary are worthy of consideration. First,
commercial and investment banking require very different types of
temperament and training.2 0 4 A commercial banker is educated
and trained to protect principal and secure repayment of a loan.
Even a well-trained commercial banker is not competent to evalu-
ate risks other than the possible failure of repayment. The invest-
ment banker, on the other hand, is educated and trained to think
and act like an entrepreneur.2 0 5 His function on behalf of the client
upon completion of investigation, evaluation, and pricing is to mar-
ket a long-term investment rather than to seek repayment of the
funds that he has placed with a client. This philosophical division
was accentuated when Glass-Steagall forced commercial and in-
vestment banking to separate. Personnel of commercial banks in-
culcated with the investment banker's philosophy, and trained to
be skilled in that art, left commercial banks en masse by June 16,
1934, and, in fact, became key principals of the investment bank-
ing community. Few senior investment banking personnel re-
mained at the major commercial banks to educate or train new em-
ployees in the investment banker's philosophy of finance.
Recent debacles in commercial banking circles highlight this di-
chotomy. During the seventies, over a span of less than four years,
commercial banks poured over $10 billion into the real estate mar-
ket. These investments were made through captive real estate in-
201. Carrington, Securities Industry Divided on Methods of Countering Competition
from Banks, Wau St. J., Dec. 3, 1982, at 42, col. 2-3.
202. Id.
203. 14 Sic. Rio. & L. REP. (BNA) 71 (Jan. 13, 1982).
204. 77 CONG. Rio. 3956 (1933).
205. See, e.g., Thackray, Investment Bankings' 10 "Toughest" Deals, CoRP. FIN., Jul.-
Aug. 1973, at 25-35.
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vestment trusts (REITS) or through loans to other real estate in-
vestment trusts."0 6 In 1973, at the peak of this activity, REIT
assets approximated $20 billion, divided amongst some two hun-
dred trusts.2"7 As swiftly as these trusts grew, their investments
soured. In 1974, eighteen of the twenty biggest losers on the New
York Stock Exchange were REIT's.2"s Commercial banks either
swapped loans and assets with the trusts or allowed them to seek
protection under bankruptcy laws. Some of the more successful
REIT's were not affiliated with commercial banks.2 0'
Aggressive loan syndication, increasingly popular because of the
broad geographic reach of large commercial banks, can be tanta-
mount to a commercial bank engaging in private placement activ-
ity. The originating commercial bank in a large loan syndication or
private placement takes little if any of the loan or placement for
its own account and markets the balance to other banks or institu-
tions. This marketing effort violates the very heart of the policy
embodied in Glass-Steagall. 10 In fact, federal regulators have
started examining national banks more regularly because of this
activity.211
When the Penn Square Bank of Oklahoma City failed during the
summer of 1982, it was discovered that several large money-center
banks had purchased several billion dollars of Penn Square origi-
nations. 12 While it is true that these activities were obstensibly
commercial banking activities, it appears that the marketing ef-
forts associated with them are what led to the difficulties. If com-
mercial banks, for example, were not permitted to syndicate any
portion of a private placement unless they retained sixty-five per-
cent of the loan, their expertise in lending would outweigh market-
ing efforts associated with the balance of the placement. This re-
quirement would operate to preserve the traditional qualities of
commercial banking and at the same time permit reasonable par-
ticipation by other lenders.
Several of the largest money center banks in this country who
206. Clark and Saunders, supra note 52, at 724.
207. Taylor, The Financial Collapse of the REIT Industry: An Analysis and Proposed
Regulatory Framework, 9 TEx. TECH. L. Rzv. 451, 460 (1978).
208. Id. at 462 n.81.
209. Id. at 455.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 13-42.
211. U.S. Examines Troubled National Banks More Often Since Demise of Penn
Square Wall St. J., Dec. 13, 1982, at 18, col. 2-3.
212. Id. For an interesting discussion of permissive syndication practices, see Helyar,
Lenders' Lament, Wall St. J., Jan. 5, 1983, at 1, col. 6.
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have made active plans to re-enter the investment banking busi-
ness lost in excess of $300 million by skirting on the fringes of the
complex government securities trading business.2 13 These large
commercial banks apparently lacked the experience needed to
properly evaluate their involvement in the investment banking
industry.
The division between commercial and investment banking is
thus more extensive than that erected by legislation; it is a matter
of education, training, motivation, and philosophy. In addition,
prevalent methods of compensation discourage a commercial
banker's successful practice of an investment banker's function.
Commercial bankers are typically compensated by a salary and de-
partmental bonus, whereas investment bankers have been tradi-
tionally compensated "by issue." This difference in incentive-one
judged by management evaluation and the other judged by per-
formance-tends to create different levels of motivation during the
course of a project's financing. The direct compensation approach
tends to create highly motivated risk takers. The salary plus bonus
approach tends to create organization men, motivated to achieve
organizational goals rather than project successes.21 4
Turning to the legislative tasks facing Congress, it is urged that
these fundamental philosophical and organizational differences be
considered during the formulation of new legislative proposals.
The basic purposes of Glass-Steagall are still very much a part of
the American economic system.21 6 The Supreme Court has af-
firmed the fundamental purpose of this legislation. 216 The failure
of repeated attempts to whittle away at the Act piecemeal is an
indication that Congress believes the allegations that commercial
bank abuses contributed to the Depression.2 17 Attempts to "laun-
dry list" permissive and impermissive non-banking activities have
repeatedly failed.2 8 The "closely related" test has become subject
to differing and conflicting interpretations." 9
Remedial legislation, designed to acknowledge the proliferation
of new financial products and to anticipate an even greater
proliferation in the future, should not be based on laundry lists or
213. Wall St. J., Oct. 7, 1982, at 4, col. 1.
214. See P. DRUCKER, THE PRACTICE OF MANAGEMENT, 333-38, (1954).
215. Camp, 401 U.S. at 639.
216. Id.
217. Rogowski, supra note 10, at 172.
218. Comment, supra note 128, at 785.
219. See Board of Governors, 450 U.S. at 73-77; Comment, supra note 126, at 786-87.
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a closely related test. Instead, adjustments to the Glass-Steagall
Act should be based upon a clear division of marketing and lend-
ing. The commercial bank's basic business is lending and the in-
vestment bank's basic business is marketing. There is a clear dif-
ference between the sale of services and the sale of investments."2 '
The future segregation of activities should be based on the poten-
tial harms which can arise from an intermingling of lending and
marketing rather than on a case by case analysis of agency versus
principal, or closely related versus unrelated. 2 It is not intended
that this marketing-lending analysis be a litmus test for an indus-
try as complex as the modern financial services industry. However,
it is offered as a fundamental philosophical backdrop to assist in
the upcoming legislative task.
The SIA and other investment banking trade groups have erro-
neously sought utilization of Glass-Steagall prohibitions to prevent
unfair competition. The Glass-Steagall Act was never envisioned as
a measure to promote competition or to lessen the evils of unfair
competition.2 Rather, the Act was intended to restore and main-
tain public confidence in commercial banks, to promote economic
stability by prohibiting imprudent banking activities, and to elimi-
nate conflicts of interest between commercial and investment
banking activities. 223 By keeping these three basic objectives in
mind, Congress should be able to formulate modern legislation
which will endure.
220. Camp, 401 U.S. at 638. The Court stated: "In short, there is a plain difference be-
tween the sale of fiduciary services and the sale of investments." Id. (footnote omitted).
221. Karmel, Glass-Steagall: Some Critical Reflections, 97 BANKING L.J. 631, 638 (1980).
222. Camp, 401 U.S. at 630; Russell 479 F.2d at 133-34; Karmel, supra note 212, at 637.
223. Ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162, Preamble (1933) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
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